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The Simple Economics of Hog Marketing Reforms in Quebec 
 
1. Introduction 
There is no arguing that the North American hog/pork sector has been going through one of its 
worst crisis of the last two decades during the 2007-2009 period. The surge in commodity prices 
in the second half of 2007 raised feed prices and other input costs at the farm level. A global 
economic recession surfaced at the end of 2007 and subsequently lowered the global demand for 
pork products. The outbreak of a new strain of the flu virus, labeled swine flu at the early stages 
of the epidemic, accelerated the decline in the world demand for pork, weakening in the process 
an already fragile industry. Other shocks specifically affected the profitability of the Canadian 
hog/pork industry. Country of origin labeling requirements in the United States (US) as well as 
an appreciation of the Canadian dollar relative to the US currency likely both contributed to 
weaken the competitive position of Canadian hog producers and pork packers.  
Two federal programs aimed at reducing the overall supply of sows in Canada as well as 
many  other  periodic  provincial  programs  have  helped  a  subset  of  hog  producers  transition 
towards  other  sectors.  Still,  the  Canadian  hog/pork  industry  has  been  hurting  and  is  just 
beginning to emerge from its economic lethargy. While desperate times do not necessarily call 
for desperate measures, they almost always call for significant changes. Quebec hog producers 
and pork packers recently agreed to sweeping changes in marketing regulations. Hog marketing 
institutions in Quebec have continuously evolved. Prior to 1994, hog supplies were marketed 
through an auction. Hog producers grew disillusioned of the auction because prices consistently 
failed to reach price levels observed in the US market. Producers and processors agreed on a 
hybrid marketing system in 1994 in which a percentage of hog supplies was pre-attributed to 
processors based on historical market shares, while the remaining hogs were auctioned off. This  
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system was quite successful in raising the average hog price above the reference price in the US 
market. However, the recent struggles of the industry pushed the average auction price at levels 
significantly below the reference price, much to the dismay of hog producers. Frustration vis-à-
vis  the  hybrid  marketing  system  also  built  up  on  the  packers’  side.  In  other  provinces,  hog 
procurement has moved away from spot markets towards models where packers own hogs or 
directly contract with hog producers to lower the overall transaction costs in the supply chain. 
This lowers transaction costs and allows packers to develop specific products to meet emerging 
food  preferences.  Processors  viewed  their  inability  to  directly  contract  with  producers  as  an 
important obstacle to getting the Quebec hog/pork industry back on its feet. 
After long and painful negotiations, packers and Quebec hog producers’ representatives 
agreed to significant reforms in hog marketing mechanisms. At the heart of the matter was the 
producers’ conviction that a marketing board with exclusive marketing rights was necessary to 
best serve their interests. Producers believe that their collective bargaining strength had to be 
preserved to counterbalance concentration on the packers’ side. Conversely, processors believed 
that no reform could lift the industry from its slump without the ability for packers to develop 
business relationships with individual producers. The new marketing agreement addresses each 
party’s main concern. Packers committed to purchase all Quebec hogs at a price no lower than 
the reference price in the US market. In return, producers agreed to a system that gives packers 
access to producers to better manage the pork supply chain.  
Three hog categories were created under the new marketing agreement: i) specialty hogs; 
ii) commodity hogs; and iii) packer-owned hogs. The producers’ board remains in control of 
marketing the hogs through the different marketing channels conditional on a set of agreed rules. 
The purpose of this system is to lift prices paid to producers and allow packers to capture market  
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share domestically and abroad. Yet, there are potential costs of implementing the new marketing 
system. It could lead to structural surpluses if packers’ revenues fall short from the level which 
would  guarantee  that  the  hog  price  commitment  is  a  profitable  strategy.  Reforms  to  the 
producers’ income support program (commonly referred to as ASRA) will likely also have an 
impact on production levels in the sector. The objective of this paper is to provide a simple 
analysis of the economics behind the new marketing rules in the Quebec hog/pork industry. This 
analysis also offers some valuable insights for other provinces as they try to address the struggles 
of their own hog/pork business.   
A  few  studies  in  the  literature  have  analyzed  the  structure  of  the  Quebec  hog/pork 
industry.  Larue  et  al.  (2000)  reviewed  the  1989  and  1994  hog  marketing  reforms  and 
investigated the determinants of hog prices on the auction. Larue, Gervais and Lapan (2004) 
showed the benefits of pre-committing hog supplies in an imperfectly competitive setting. They 
also provided an efficiency rationale to the existence of a subsidy program in hog production. 
Gervais and Tamini (2005) proposed  a coincident economic index to measure the economic 
environment of the Quebec hog/pork industry. They argue that the 1994 hog marketing reform 
was  the  most  important  trigger  of  the  industry  growth.  Finally,  Gervais  and  Doyon  (2004) 
investigated different risk management strategies for Quebec hog producers, especially focusing 
on the complementarities between the futures market and ASRA. While all these papers touched 
upon  different  facets  of  Quebec  hog  marketing  institutions,  none  have  analyzed  the  current 
marketing mechanisms.  
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section focuses on the 
recent business relations between Quebec producers and packers and details the chronology of 
events that brought changes in hog marketing mechanisms. It also provides a detailed description  
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of the new marketing arrangements. Section three presents simple analytical tools to discuss the 
efficiency  of  marketing  reforms  in  the  Quebec  hog/pork  industry.  Section  four  provides  an 
empirical  counterpart  to  the  analytics  presented  in  the  previous  section.  The  final  section 
concludes.   
 
2. A Chronology of the events leading to the most recent reform 
As mentioned in the introduction, Larue et al (2000) provide a detailed account of the changes in 
marketing institutions prior to 2000. From 1989 to March 1994, Quebec hog producers marketed 
their hogs through an electronic auction. A reform led to a hybrid system in which a significant 
share of the hogs was pre-attributed to packers based on their historical market shares and sold at 
a  pre-determined  price  while  the  remaining  hogs  were  sold  through  the  auction.  The  two 
mechanisms co-existed until very recently. Over the years, the proportion of hogs that were pre-
attributed evolved between 50 and 80 percent. In 2000, short-term contracts were introduced as a 
third  hog  marketing  mechanism.  Both  the  importance  of  the  electronic  auction  and  pre-
attribution were lowered to auction off fixed supplies of hogs over a period of one month.  
Dissatisfaction with the hog marketing mechanisms emerged in the second half of this 
decade  for  many  of  the  same  reasons  that  transpired  in  the  early  1990s.  The  frustration  of 
producers with the auction was driven by prices lower than the US reference price. Figure 1 
presents the weekly average price paid under the auction and pre-attribution mechanisms from 
early  2004  to  the  end  of  2009.  Following  pressures  by  the  Quebec  hog  marketing  board 
(Fédération des producteurs de porcs du Québec, FPPQ), the Régie des marchés agricoles du 
Québec (RMAQ) suspended the auction mechanism in October 2006. Producers’ representatives 
argued that prices on the auction should not be consistently below the US reference price given 
Quebec  packers  operate  in  a  fairly  open  North  American  marketplace.  In  mid-2006,  the  
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difference between the auction price and the US reference price reached as much as $30 per 100 
kg,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  2.  The  FPPQ  launched  an  internal  review  of  hog  marketing 
mechanisms in December 2006 and the auction resumed in April 2007. Despite early indications 
that  auction  prices  were  going  to  hover  around  the  US  reference  price,  the  price  difference 
observed  in  mid-2006  quickly  resumed.  Given  mounting  acrimony  between  producers  and 
processors, the Quebec Minister of Agriculture named a mediator to explore potential reforms of 
hog marketing institutions in September 2007. At the end of 2007, the difference between the US 
reference price and the average weekly price on the auction was more than $25 per 100 kg.  
The government representative reported in March 2008 that he could not find middle 
grounds  between  producers  and  processors  on  the  issue  of  reorganizing  the  hog  marketing 
system. Producers named their own special negotiator in early 2008 and decided to continue 
negotiating with processors throughout 2008. A tentative agreement between producers and five 
packers was reached in June 2008, but only the largest packer in the province turned out to be 
willing to sign onto the final document in December 2008. As a result, the FPPQ asked the 
RMAQ to arbitrate a new marketing agreement between producers and processors. At the end of 
2008, the difference between the US reference price and the average auction price had reached 
more than $45 per 100 kg. With the prospects of a new agreement nowhere in sight, the FPPQ 
asks  the  RMAQ  to  suspend  the  auction  mechanism.  The  RMAQ  agreed  and  suspended  the 
auction on February 13, 2009, setting the price of all hogs at the US reference price minus $4 
until April 17, 2009. Finally, after nearly 18 months of intense negotiations that involved the 
provincial government and special mediators, Quebec hog producers and packers settled on a 
new hog marketing agreement (hereafter referred to as the Agreement) on May 18, 2009. The 
Agreement was ratified on June 12, 2009 with an implementation date of September 7, 2009.   
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The core principles of the Agreement between producers and processors are: 
·  to send clear quality signals to producers so that buyers can secure high-quality supplies; 
·  to fix a fair price that accounts for North American market conditions;  
·  to tailor hog characteristics to buyers’ needs; 
·  to preserve the exclusive marketing rights of the producers’ board; 
·  to minimize transaction costs in the supply chain. 
The Agreement links all Quebec hog producers (as identified by the Plan conjoint des 
producteurs de porcs du Québec), the  FPPQ and buyers. The most important change to the 
marketing rules that existed prior to 2009 is arguably the introduction of three different hog 
categories:  
1.   Packer-owned hogs: a hog assigned to a specific slaughterhouse owned by a buyer for 
which the producer controls at least ten percent of the voting shares, or owned by a legal 
entity for which a producer owns 50 % or more of the voting and equity shares.  
2.   Specialty hogs: a hog that was raised and/or fed according to specific buyer demands that 
imply differentiation from a standard commodity hog. The different characteristics of a 
specialty hog must be verified at all stages of the supply chain and must have the purpose 
of creating additional value along the supply chain. The specificity must be recognized by 
a committee that oversees differentiation in the Quebec hog/pork supply chain. 
3.   Commodity hogs: all other hogs not included in the previous two designations.  
The marketing mechanisms rest on two important components: i) a price commitment by 
buyers; and ii) prioritized allocation of the hogs. Buyers commit to pay a reference price for all 
hogs purchased. This price is determined according to the following formula: the index 100 hog 
price in $Can per 100 kg is equal to the USDA weighted average net price (weights are the  
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“negotiated” and “swine or pork market formula” hogs) in $US per 100 lb times an adjustment 
factor for the American carcass (0.74), divided by an adjustment for the Canadian carcass (0.80), 
times the exchange rate, times the pound per kg conversion factor (2.2046). 
In the first year of the Agreement, the FPPQ determines the allocation of hogs to each 
buyer according to the following rules:  
1.  The FPPQ assigns to a buyer 100 % of all hogs bought from the FPPQ between April 1 
2008 and March 31, 2009; 
2.   hogs that remain available are offered to all buyers. If the buyers’ demand is greater than 
the  supply  of  available  hogs,  the  available  hogs  are  allocated  in  percentage  of  the 
purchases made in the twelve months preceding the allocation period; 
3.   if hogs are still available, they can be allocated to buyers that express a demand for these 
hogs after the allocation period has started; 
4.   if hogs are still available, they could be assigned to a new entrant as long as this new 
buyer becomes a signatory to the Agreement.  
Once the allocation process reaches step three above, the FPPQ can trigger the surplus disposal 
mechanism defined in the Agreement. The FPPQ revises allocations twice a year (August 1 and 
February 1). In each review process, the FPPQ repeats the four steps outlined above accounting 
for 100 percent of the hogs purchased in the last 12 months, with the exception of surplus hogs 
marketed under the surplus disposal mechanism.   
The allocation priorities are the following: 1) packer-owned hogs; 2) specialty hogs; and 
3) commodity hogs. Buyers get their hog allocation by first filling requests for packer-owned and 
specialty  hogs.  Commodity  hogs  are  allocated  to  the  closest  slaughterhouse  until  the  total 
number of hogs reaches the allocation of this particular plant. If needed, production sites are  
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assigned  to  the  second  closest  slaughterhouse  until  reaching  the  allocation  for  this  facility. 
Allocation is done for a full production site (no breaking lots to different slaughterhouses). The 
FPPQ plans hog allocations and it notifies producers and buyers of what the shipments and 
receipts are based on mandatory reporting of piglets going into finishing operations.  
When a specialty hog is officially recognized by the differentiation control committee, 
the product specifications of this hog are posted on the FPPQ website, at the same time as the 
expert opinion of the committee relative to the premium paid for this type of hog. A first-come-
first-serve  system  is  implemented  to  determine  which  producers  are  assigned  the  rights  to 
produce the specialty hogs. Buyers’ requests for specialty hogs must include a detailed list of 
particular  production  methods,  additional  costs  incurred  by  producers,  a  grading  grid, 
requirements relative to input usage, premiums paid to producers and mechanisms to adjust these 
premiums following fluctuations in input prices. Packers need to detail also how the proposed 
specialty product is different than the commodity product, the markets that are targeted and list 
the  attributes  that  will  allow  buyers  to  differentiate  the  product  at  the  retail  level  from 
commodity meats.  
A buyer is required to accept delivery of all hogs that are allocated to him in one of its 
slaughterhouse. Buyers that own multiple plants have the rights to decide where ownership hogs 
and specialty hogs will be slaughtered. Producers must confirm to his/her assigned buyer the 
number of hogs to be delivered at least 48 hours before delivery. Any increase in the production 
of specialty hogs must come from the pool of commodity hogs assigned to the particular buyer 
making the request. In other words, the demand for specialty hogs cannot be manipulated to 
increase the overall number of hogs assigned to a buyer. Any increase in the overall supply 
assigned to a buyer must be made in accordance with provisions set forth in the Agreement  
9 
 
relative to changes in packing capacity. A buyer must notify the FPPQ of any increase in packing 
capacity at least nine months before the allocation date.  
Any  decrease  in  capacity  must  be  reported  to  the  FPPQ  three  months  before  the 
implementation date. As mentioned before, a surplus program is administered by the FPPQ when 
some hogs remain to be allocated. The FPPQ posts available hog supplies and potential buyers 
(note  that  this  includes  buyers  that  are  not  signatories  to  the  Agreement)  have  five  days  to 
respond to the FPPQ if they desire to purchase the hogs. Hogs are sold to the highest bidder and 
in the likely event that the auction price is lower than the reference price, the price difference of 
surplus hogs is pooled across producers.  
 
3. An economic analysis 
This section analyzes the impact of reforming marketing mechanisms using simple analytical 
tools. There are many dimensions to the issue of marketing hogs. Product differentiation and the 
existence of potential market power are certainly two of the most important dimensions of the 
marketing reform; yet it is quite difficult to account for these aspects using two-dimensional 
graph analysis. Properly modeling imperfect competition in the supply chain needs to account 
minimally  for  the  interactions  between  at  least  two  processors.  It  is  next  to  impossible  to 
illustrate the implications of each firm’s pricing decision on the industry output without relying 
on a three dimensional analysis. Hence, we first consider that none of the buyers are able to 
exercise market power. We are thus able to represent the demand and supply conditions in the 
Quebec  hog/pork  industry  by  well-behaved  demand  and  supply  schedules.  Clearly,  a  chief 
concern of the industry is the ability to create value in the supply chain by offering differentiated 
products to consumers. For much of the same reasons mentioned before, we will abstract from  
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quality issues in the supply chain and argue that the price and quantity variables represent a 
weighted average of the different products marketed in the hog/pork supply chain.   
One of the cornerstones of Quebec agricultural policy is the agricultural income support 
program, known under the French acronym ASRA. ASRA works much like a price support 
program  as  producers  are  guaranteed  to  receive  a  certain  price  no  lower  than  the  average 
production costs computed from a sample of representative farms. The compensation is funded 
by premiums that are set as a function of market conditions and are subsidized. The ASRA 
program is funded according to a one-third/two-third rule by Quebec hog producers and the 
provincial  and  federal  governments,  respectively.  Before  diving  into  the  economics  of  hog 
marketing mechanisms, we will first focus on the impact of the price support policy.  
Consider the market for hogs illustrated in Figure 3. The segment D0 represents the hog 
demand of processors while S0 represents the marginal cost of hog producers. A price support 
policy implies that the bold segment in Figure 3 is now the relevant supply curve. Output under 
price support increases from Q0 to QS. Buyers’ willingness to pay falls to pB given the increase in 
production and the extent of the subsidy is measured by the difference between pS and pB. One 
way to understand the significance of pB in the market is to think of this price as the marginal 
valuation attached to the hogs marketed through the auction when some hogs are pre-attributed at 
the US reference price. The price pB can be lower or higher than the US reference price. In a 
market with a declining demand for pork meat, the packers’ demand for hogs would decline and 
push down the marginal valuation of the hogs sold in the auction. Of course, ASRA does not act 
as  a  pure  price  support  scheme  because  producers  pay  one-third  of  the  subsidy  needed  to 
guarantee the price pS.  Nevertheless, we will think of ASRA as a price support for the purpose at 
hand.   
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Figure 4 introduces the role of the reference price which is denoted pUS. Given the size of 
the Quebec industry relative to the North American market, changes in the Quebec hog/pork 
market  have  no  impacts  on  the  reference  price.  The  Agreement  implies  a  commitment  by 
processors to purchase all hogs at the reference price. The auction price was below the reference 
price prior to the reform, and thus pUS > pB in Figure 4. Under the same market conditions as in 
Figure 3, the valuation of the marginal hog would actually be lower than the US reference price. 
Yet, processors committed to purchase all hogs produced domestically (denoted by QS) at a price 
pUS which has definitely been higher on average than pB in the last few months or even years 
according to Figure 1. If we think of pB as the average value of hogs purchased by buyers, the 
shaded area represents the costs of committing to purchase all hogs at the predetermined US 
reference price. Clearly, processors lose money if somehow the valuation they attach to the hogs 
does not increase following the marketing reform.  
If the reform leads processors to develop new products and increase revenues such that 
their valuation of hogs  implies a move from D0 to D1, the market would then reach  a new 
equilibrium which will be denoted by pE. In other words, pE is the price that would prevail in a 
free market after the reform is implemented (i.e. without the price commitment made by buyers). 
The  insistence  of  processors  throughout  the  overall  negotiation  process  to  gain  flexibility  in 
marketing may be understood as an effort to raise net revenues in order to cover the higher 
procurement costs. However, it raises important questions as to what happens in situations in 
which the reference price is higher or lower than pE.  
Consider the situation depicted in Figure 5. In this case, the shift in demand from D0 to 
D1 entails an equilibrium price that would be larger than the US reference price. In other words, 
there is an excess demand at the US reference price (equal to QUS – QS). Producers have no  
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incentives to increase production because the equilibrium price pE is still lower than the support 
price, yet processors demand more hogs at the reference price because (presumably) successful 
and novel supply chains entail larger profit in the downstream market for pork products. The new 
marketing agreement plans for situations in which a processor wants to increase capacity and 
slaughter more hogs. Yet, there is no incentive to increase production at the farm level – the 
price support system trumps the market signal. 
 Obviously, the reverse situation could occur. Market conditions could be such that new 
pork  products  do  not  command  as  high  a  premium  in  the  downstream  market  as  initially 
believed, and thus the demand for domestic hogs is lower than what was anticipated following 
the reform. Consider the market situation illustrated in Figure 6. The US reference price is above 
the price that would clear the market (pE). The valuation of hogs by processors is too low and, as 
a result, there is an excess supply of hogs at the pre-determined reference price (equal to QS – 
QUS).  In reality, the packers’  commitment to purchase historical volumes solves this surplus 
situation  in  the  short-run.  In  the  long-run,  this  situation  is  untenable  from  the  packers’ 
perspective and some firms would certainly seek to lower their packing capacity according to the 
process laid out in the Agreement.  
The obvious disadvantage of the current marketing system is the rigidity introduced in 
supply chain by the price commitment coupled with the existence of the price support policy. An 
excess supply or excess demand can potentially hurt the integrity of the marketing system if it 
occurs on a consistent basis. Excess demand can potentially harm a specific market segment over 
the long-run if packers cannot meet the demand for a new product. Usually, the hog price would 
adjust to lower the demand of packers and/or raise the output of producers. Alternatively, lower 
hog  production  costs  could  trigger  an  increase  in  the  industry’s  output.  However,  without  
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proportional upward adjustments in packing capacity, the impact of an increase in production 
would have to be fully absorbed by producers through a lower pool price.    
The kind of disequilibrium described above was to be addressed through the Règlement 
sur la gestion équilibrée de la production (regulation on balanced output management) that is 
mentioned within the Agreement. A first version of the regulation was approved by a majority of 
producers in September 2008 and called for an allocation of a base output to each production site 
(as opposed to each producer
1) with provisions to allocate future production increases across 
producers. This regulation was however never brought in front of the RMAQ to be formally 
implemented.  
A reform in ASRA almost certainly had an impact on the decision to push back the 
discussion on the regulation of production in the industry. As mentioned before, ASRA provides 
a compensation to hog producers when the average market price falls below an industry-wide 
estimate of producers’ average cost. Producers pay a premium for the income insurance which is 
set at one third of the actuarially fair premium (i.e., the premium needed to ensure that the 
insurance fund is balanced). The other two-thirds of the contributions are provided by the federal 
and provincial governments. Figure 7 details Quebec hog producers’ ASRA support level in 
comparison to average market prices from 2000 to 2009. The solid line represents the stabilized 
income  level  while  the  dotted  line  measures  the  average  market  price.  During  this  10-year 
period, the market price exceeded the target price in four instances. Over the period, the average 
compensation  (inclusive  of  the  producers’  contribution)  was  over  $36  per  100  kg.  The 
compensation ballooned in the last three years going from $37 to $54 to $59 as hog prices tanked 
and feed prices increased.  
                                                 
1 The idea is to preserve the balance of power between growers and integrators, but the issue is likely to create some 
controversy. Integrators generally own the hogs but contract individuals to bring their hogs to market weight. The 
contractant however owns the building and supply the inputs.     
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The global downturn in the industry is reflected in the accumulated deficit of ASRA 
measured on the right hand-side vertical axis of Figure 7. The accumulated deficit exploded to 
$412 million in 2008. As a result, significant changes to the program eligibility and financial 
parameters  have  been  approved  by  the  government  on  March  31,  2010.  Some  of  the  most 
significant changes imply dropping the 25 percent least efficient farms from the computation of 
the average production cost
2, raising the insurance premium of farms that exceed by three times 
the average farms size, and capping the individual producer’s output eligible for payments. The 
exclusion of least efficient farms will lower the guaranteed price by an estimated three percent 
on average. The second measure will ask largest farms to make a greater effort towards erasing 
the deficit of the insurance fund. The third measure is especially important because it can be seen 
as a tool to limit production. While it does not establish binding caps on production, the fact that 
the cost-of-production guarantee will not be offered to producers exceeding a certain output can 
be considered an implicit ceiling (albeit imperfect) on industry output. 
 
Imperfect competition 
How does the Agreement deal with producers’ concern of increased concentration in the supply 
chain? From the producers’ perspective, it is clear that they see collective marketing as the best 
tool to counterbalance the potential exercise of market power in downstream markets. Larue, 
Gervais and Lapan (2004) analyzed the Quebec hog/pork industry in the context of concentration 
and suggested that the existence of a price support program increased welfare for the industry. 
Their argument was centered on the existence of lags between when output plans are made and 
output is marketed (i.e. the lag between when hogs are fed and finally reach market weight). The 
                                                 
2  This  particular  provision  of  the  ASRA  reform  is  quite  controversial  and  is  currently  debated  between  hog 
producers representatives and the government agency that oversees the provincial income support programs.   
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supply illustrated in Figures 3 through 6 can be thought as the long-run supply. In the short-run, 
the supply is (almost) perfectly inelastic.  
  Figure 8 illustrates the impact of production lags when there is only a single buyer in the 
market. The segment D0 still represent the marginal valuation of hogs by the buyer, but we must 
now recognize that the more hogs it buys, the higher the final purchase price will be. For all 
practical matters, the relevant supply schedule in the short-run is SR. What will be the price 
offered  by  the  buyer?  It  depends  on  the  marketing  alternatives  of  producers.  Assume  that 
producers can sell their hogs across the border at the US reference price minus some transaction 
cost T. The domestic buyer only needs to offer a price slightly above  US p T -  to capture all of the 
available supply. Without enforceable contracts that commit the buyer to pay a certain price 
before output is set at the farm level. Producers fully anticipate the behavior of the buyer and 
should lower their output accordingly, thus shifting the long-run supply curve to the left. This is 
what Larue, Gervais and Lapan (2004) labeled a low-price / low-capacity trap. The existence of 
the price support policy changes this welfare-inferior equilibrium. Production would be at level 
QS and this illustrates the benefits of the price support. The price commitment plays much of the 
same role here. It guarantees that buyers will pay a price higher than the next best alternative. Of 
course, the industry is not yet at the point where one would consider the market structure a quasi-
monopsony.  Yet,  increased  concentration  can  certainly  lead  to  market  outcomes  that  are 
approaching the monopsony equilibrium illustrated in Figure 8. The price commitment in the 
Agreement addresses some of the market inefficiencies potentially arising because of market 
power.  
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Vertical coordination and transaction costs  
The reform in the hog  marketing system was  also partially driven by the desire to improve 
vertical coordination in the industry through minimizing transaction costs
3 between packers and 
producers. The extent of transaction costs is determined mainly by three factors: i) uncertainty; 
ii) asset specificity; and iii) frequency of the transaction. When there is little uncertainty about 
the quality of a product, transactions will tend to be made on a spot market. Similarly, goods that 
do not require a high degree of transaction-specific assets (i.e. assets of physical or human nature 
that would be difficult to redeploy to a different sector) would tend to occur in spot markets as 
well. Finally, transactions repeated frequently tend to be carried out in the spot market because 
the buyer and seller have many chances to gather information about the other party and this leads 
to reputation issues.  
The introduction of different hog categories and the emphasis on specialty hogs in the 
Agreement  clearly  raise  concerns  about  opportunistic  behavior.  For  example,  producing  a 
specialty hog requires investing in some specific human and physical capital that may in some 
instances  be  of  little  value  if  offered  to  a  different  buyer.  Without  mechanisms  to  prevent 
opportunistic behavior on the part of buyer (or sellers), a businesses could be tempted to exploit 
a situation to its own advantage (e.g., by renegotiating the terms of a contract after investments 
in specific assets have been made). In that regard, the Agreement protects sellers and buyers 
from  opportunistic  behavior.  It  also  addresses  other  coordination  issues  such  as  matching 
producers with packers by minimizing transportation costs and lining up incentives and rewards 
for  hog  producers  based  on  packers’  market  requirements  which  are  mainly  derived  from 
consumer preferences. The Agreement addresses coordination issues that have been dealt with in 
other  producing  regions  such  as  Western  Canada  and  the  US  for  a  number  of  years.  The 
                                                 
3 Hobbs (1996) offers a good review of the theory of transaction costs.   
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challenge  for  the  Quebec  hog/pork  industry  has  always  been  to  solve  these  issues  while 
preserving collective marketing tools at the farm level. 
 
4. Numerical example 
The purpose of this section is to complement the analytics presented in the previous section. As 
hinted throughout, the marketing reform clearly raises per-unit revenues for producers as packers 
commit to pay a reference price that has been higher than the average price paid on the auction 
between 2007 and 2009. The benefits for processors are less obvious. On the one hand, they 
commit to pay a higher average price for hogs and thus this increases their overall procurement 
costs.  In  return,  they  secure  supplies  (thus  reduce  some  of  the  risk  they  face)  and  have  the 
opportunity to directly work with producers to develop new marketing segments. The ability to 
develop a business relationship with individual producers can increase packers’ revenues as well 
as lower their costs. In what follows, we develop a simple numerical example that illustrates the 
expected benefits that packers must receive to compensate the higher procurement costs they 
have committed to pay.  
  Given  the  presence  of  a  price  commitment  in  the  Agreement,  it  seems  important  to 
measure the benefits and costs of the marketing reform in a framework that accounts for risk 
preferences. We will assume that packers maximize expected utility of profits which will be 
expressed in a mean-variance framework. Let the individual output of a packer be represented by 
the variable q. The output price will be denoted by p and the variable c will measure average 
variable costs which are assumed to be constant. Let the subscript “0” and “1” denote the pre- 
reform and post-reform periods, respectively. In the pre-reform period, we will focus on the pre-
attribution and auction mechanisms. We will also assume that the pre-attribution price is equal to  
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the reference price under the new marketing agreement. Finally, let the symbol “~” denote a 
random variable. Profits in the pre-reform and post-reform periods are, respectively:  
(1)  ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 1
US A p c q r q r q p a a = - - - - ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
(2)  ( ) 1 1 1
US p c q r q p = - - ɶ ɶ ɶ  
where 
US r ɶ   and 
A r ɶ   are,  respectively,  the  hog  price  under  pre-attribution  and  the  auction 
mechanisms and a  ( ) 1 a -  is the share of hogs that is pre-attributed (auctioned).  
It is important to emphasize the differences between equations (1) and (2). The volume 
available to the packer is identical under the two situations. In reality, there is some uncertainty 
associated with the number of hogs bought on the auction  ( ) ( ) 1 q a -  by a packer. However, to 
simplify the analysis, we will assume that the only difference in risk is with respect to the price 
paid  for  these  hogs.  Average  variable  costs  are  known  to  packers  but  are  assumed  to  be 
potentially different in the two situations. The distribution of the output price is also assumed 
different  under  the  two  marketing  systems.  In  what  follows,  we  assume  that  only  the  first 
moment of the distribution is affected by the reform of marketing mechanisms. The objective is 
to estimate the minimum change in the expected output price and average variable costs that is 
required to make packers indifferent between the two marketing mechanisms. The analytics in 
the previous section emphasized that the reform can only be sustainable in the long-run if it 
raises the packers’ demand of hogs above a certain threshold. This increase in demand will be 
triggered by increase revenues in the output market or cost savings in processing. What the 
simple analysis of section three did not address is that the marketing reform also decreases the 
risk faced by packers.  




[ ] [ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 0
2 2 2 2 2 2
,
0.5 1
0.5 1 2 1 US A A US
US A
p r r r r
EU E V p c r r q
q
p l p a a
l a s a s s a a s
= + = - - - -
- + - + + -
 
(4)  [ ] [ ] ( ) ( )
2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 US
US
p r EU E V p c r q q p l p l s s = + = - - - +  
where the symbol “-” denotes an expected value, 
2
US r s , 
2
A r s  and 
2
p s  denote, respectively, the 
variance of the reference price, the variance of the auction price and the variance of the output 
price, 
,
A US r r s  denotes the covariance between the auction and pre-attribution prices and l  is the 
packers’ Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA). The potential covariance between the 
packers’  output  price  and  the  hog  price  has  been  set  to  zero  in  (3)  and  (4)  given  that  the 
calibration exercise described below revealed minimal correlation between these two variables.  
  In order to compare expected utility under the two marketing scenarios, the variables and 
parameters in (3) and (4) need to be calibrated. We collected data from the red meat market 
statistics website of Agriculture and Agri-food Canada (AAFC). Table 1 summarizes the value of 
the baseline variables used in the calibration exercise. The variance of the auction price was 
obtained from the residuals of a linear regression of the auction price on the pre-attribution price. 
Given the pre-attribution price is based on a  US reference price and  is exogenous from the 
perspective of the Quebec hog/pork industry, an Auto-Regressive (AR) process of order 1 was 
specified to  estimate its variance. The output price was computed as  a weighted  average of 
wholesale prices for four different pork cuts (shoulder, ham, loin and belly). An AR(1) process 
was fitted to the constructed series to estimate the variance. The packer’s output in (3) and (4) is 
based on one-half of the average monthly output in 2009, and thus the simulation may be thought 
of as representing the largest packer in Quebec. Expected prices are the 2009 average of weekly 
prices. The share of pre-attribution is set at 50%.   
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Table 1. Summary of the baseline variables used in the calibration exercise 
Variables    Pre-reform    Post-reform 
q (pre-attribution)    164,500    329,000 
q (auction)    164,500    n.a. 
CARA    tbs    tbs 
c    25    x 
p     157    x 
US r     125    125 
A r     tbs    n.a 
p s     19.0    19.0 
US r s     5.8    5.8 
A r s     13.0    n.a. 
,
A US r r s     5.4    n.a. 
Note:  All  dollar  values  are  expressed  in  $  per  100  kg  on  a 
carcass basis. The notation n.a. means “not applicable” while tbs 
means “to be simulated”. The variable x identifies the values that 
will be solved by the numerical simulation. 
 
The value of the CARA and the extent of the difference between the auction price and 
pre-attribution  price  will  be  calibrated  such  that  the  packer  is  indifferent  between  the  two 
marketing scenarios. The objective of the simulations is to uncover the necessary adjustments in 
the packer’s expected gross margin for the firm to be indifferent between the two marketing 
systems. The expected gross margin is computed as the expected output price minus average 
variable cost (i.e.,  1 1 p c - ). In reality, both of these variables may be adjusting as a result of the 
marketing reform. The expected output price can increase because it is easier for packers to now 
supply  differentiated  products  that  command  a  premium  in  the  retail  markets.  Alternatively, 
variable costs can be lower following the reform because packers can now tailor their input 
requirements so that processing costs fall.  
We expect that the increase in the expected gross margin which is needed for the packer 
to be indifferent between the two marketing mechanisms will be a decreasing function of the 
degree  of  risk  aversion  and  of  the  expected  auction  price.  The  higher  is  the  degree  of  risk  
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aversion,  the  more  benefits  a  packer  will  derive  from  the  new  marketing  system  because  it 
committed to purchase a pre-determined volume at a pre-determined price instead of actively 
bidding up for hog supplies. Given procurement risk, it may not need a large increase in the 
expected gross margin because it obtains benefits from a partial reduction in risk. The closer is 
the auction price to the pre-attribution price, the higher are total procurement costs of the packer. 
In that case, it does not make a major impact to commit to purchase all hog supplies at the 
reference  price  (which  be  assumption  is  equal  to  the  pre-attribution  price).  Once  again,  the 
processing  firm  would  not  need  a  significant  increase  in  the  expected  gross  margin  to  be 
indifferent between the two marketing systems.     
Table 2 presents the results of the simulation. We chose to report the results using a 
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) coefficient instead of CARA because the former is 
easier to understand. The CRRA coefficient is computed as the CARA coefficient multiplied by 
expected profits and can be thought of as an elasticity. The results are in accordance with the 
intuition laid out in the above paragraph. When the expected auction price is 95 percent of the 
average  pre-attribution  price  ($118.80),  the  packer  only  needs  an  increase  of  $2.97  in  the 
expected gross margin to be indifferent between the two marketing systems at a low level of 
relative  risk  aversion  (CRRA  =  1).  Any  amount  above  this  threshold  will  bring  additional 
benefits to the packer. If the expected auction price decreases to 75 percent of the expected pre-
attribution price, the required increase in expected gross benefits jumps to $15.19 per 100 kg. In 
other words, when the  expected gross margin  ( ) 0 0 p c -  in the pre-reform system is $127, a 
packer must be able to gain 12 percent in cost efficiencies and/or increased revenues following 
the reform. This gain does not have to be this large for a moderate level of risk aversion. When 
the CRRA is equal to 5, the difference in the expected gross margin is a more reasonable $6.40,  
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an increase of around 5 percent from the price level of the pre-reform. The negative numbers in 
the southeast corner of the table indicate that the Agreement would generate significant benefits 
for the packer without accounting for potential cost savings.  
 
Table 2. Minimum gain in net revenues for packers to prefer  
the marketing reform to the status quo 
      Expected  auction price (in $ and as a  
percentage of the reference price) 
      $93.80 (75%)    $106.30 (85%)    $118.80 (95%) 
  1    15.19    8.78    2.17 
CRRA  5    13.47    6.40    (1.65) 
  10    11.31    3.43    (6.42) 
  
5. Concluding remarks 
The last three years have been quite tumultuous for North American hog producers. While the 
hog/pork industry is a notoriously cyclical industry, many economic factors converged to create 
a  perfect  storm  for  the  hog/pork  industry.  These  external  factors  contributed  to  acrimonious 
business relationships between hog producers and pork packers. On one side, packers argued that 
the depressed world demand for pork products and the appreciating value of the Canadian dollar 
tightened margins in packing activities and inevitably leading to lower hog prices. On the other 
side, producers argued that packers compete in a fairly open marketplace and thus these factors 
alone could not explain the significant differences in hog prices between the Quebec and US 
markets. Both groups however recognized that the industry evolved over the years and that the 
marketing mechanisms developed in the mid-nineties needed to be adjusted.    
Other  provinces  have  also  experienced  some  turbulence,  albeit  to  different  degrees. 
Western hog producers rely a lot more on the US market to sell their production and thus the 
implementation  of  mandatory  country  of  origin  labeling  in  2008  has  had  a  more  significant  
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impact  on  their  business  (Rude,  Gervais  and  Felt,  2010)  than  for  the  industry  in  Quebec. 
Financial stress was perhaps greater for hog operations in Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario than in 
Quebec  because  of  the  existence  of  income  support  in  the  latter  province.  Nevertheless, 
marketing mechanisms have been studied and debated almost everywhere.  
The Ontario Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs recently overturned some of 
the findings of its own tribunal on appeals of a decision of the Ontario Farm Products Marketing 
Commission with regards to the existence and future of the Ontario Pork Producers’ Marketing 
Board. In essence, the recent ministerial decision confirms the role of OPPMB in regulating hog 
production  in  the  province  and  the  importance  of  its  role  in  collecting  and  disseminating 
information about volumes and prices in the industry. However, the ministerial decision opens 
the door to an open hog marketing system in Ontario through which producers are free to choose 
how to market their hogs effective December 4, 2010. In that regards, this decision follows 
closely the open market system in Alberta. Producers can directly contract with packers, but a 
significant share of producers chooses to market their output through the Western Hog Exchange 
(WHE) which was formed as a result of this transition away from a mandatory board.  
It is clear that all hog/pork supply chains have evolved toward models where packers and 
producers can work out coordination issues in production and marketing between themselves. 
Quebec hog producers fought hard to retain collective marketing tools, but the fact that direct 
contractual relationships in other provinces offer more flexibility cannot be overlooked. Quebec 
hog  producers  are  betting  that  their  collective  bargaining  strength  outweigh  the  rigidities 
introduced in the supply chain.   
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Figure 1. Average weekly hog price under the auction and  
pre-attribution systems, January 2004 to December 2009. 
 
 
Figure 2. Difference between the average weekly hog price under the auction and  







































































































Figure 7.  
 
 











































pB = pUS - T